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ABSTRACTS

added). No cases have been found construing this statute. However, the words "wherever earned" make a strong case for the
proposition that the legislature intended to aggregate the earnings
from all employments, similar or dissimilar, in computing the employee's average weekly wage.
Menis Elbert Ketchum, 11

ABSTRACTS
Attorney and Client-Disciplinary Action for Negligence and
Inattention by an Attorney
Respondent practiced law while engaged in full-time employment in an unrelated field. He was charged with misrepresenting
to his client the reason for an extensive delay in the disposition of
a divorce case. The delay was caused by his failure to obtain an
entry of default. Held, suspended. The attorney should be suspended until he can devote himself fully to the practice of law.
In the Matter of Klaiber, 46 N.J. 133, 215 A.2d 29 (1965).
Several courts have held that negligence, inattention or professional incompetence in handling a client's affairs constitutes a violation of the cannons of professional ethics, attorney's oath or court
rule. In re Greer, 52 Ariz. 385, 81 P.2d 96 (1938); State ex rel. The
Florida Bar v. Fishkind, 107 So. 2d 131 (Fla. 1958).
In some instances negligence and inattention with respect to a
client's affairs have resulted in disbarment. In re Hall, 58 Ariz.
67, 118 P.2d 67 (1941); In re Hermann, 165 Ore. 59, 105 P.2d 512
(1940). On the other hand, some courts regard negligence and
inattention as grounds for suspension or censure. People ex rel.
Chicago Bar v. Anderson, 273 Ill. 37, 112 N.E. 273 (1916); Attorney
Gen. v. Lane, 259 Mich. 283, 243 N.W. 6 (1932).
An investigation of the cases reveals that the courts have called
particular attention to factors other than mere inattention. Some
courts have considered the fact the fees were received in advance
for services never rendered or rendered only after formal charges
were brought. In re Hall, supra; In re Hermann, supra. In other
instances courts have considered the prior history of misconduct
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by the attorney. Waterman v. State Bar of California, 8 Cal. 2d
17, 63 P.2d 1133 (1936); In re Moller, 248 App. Div. 877, 290
N.Y.S. 257 (1936).
The West Virginia Code provides that in any case of malpractice,
any court of record shall order an attorney to be summoned to
show cause why his license should not be suspended or annulled.
W. VA. CODE ch. 30, art. 2, § 7 (Michie 1961). The West Virginia
court has held that misconduct justifying disbarment must show
that the attorney is unworthy of public trust and confidence and
that he is unfit to exercise the privileges and duties of his profession. In re Damron, 131 W.Va. 66, 45 S.E.2d 741 (1947). No
cases have been reported concerning negligence or inattention regarding a client's affairs. Malpractice, however, is a broad term
which includes wilfull, negligent and ignorant misconduct. Gould
v. State, 127 So. 309 (Fla. 1930). It would be possible for the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia to reach a decision
that is in accord with the principal case.

Estate Tax-Methods for Evaluating the Reversionary
Interest of a Decedent
The decedent during her life created an irrevocable trust under
which the settlor was to receive the income from the trust for life,
with remainders to her son and daughter or to the survivor of
them. The trust instrument provided that the trust would terminate
and be paid to the settlor in the event that the remaindermen predeceased the settlor. The decendent's daughter predeceased her but
her son survived her. For nine years prior to her death the decedent was in declining health. At the time of her death, the decedent
had a life expectancy according to standard mortality tables of only
three years, and her reversionary interest was further limited by the
improbability that she would survive her son, who had a life expectancy of fifteen years. The Commissioner assessed Ps, executors
of the decedent's estate, with a deficiency by including in the
decendent's estate the value of the decedent's reversionary interest
as determined by the mortality tables. Ps filed a claim for a refund
which was granted by the district court on the theory that the basis
of the valuation of the interest is the actual life expectancy as
indicated by the facts of the case. Held, affirmed. Factors which
relate to the decedent's physical and mental condition may be con-
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sidered for the purpose of computing the value of the gross estate.
Hall v. United States, 353 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1965).
The value of the gross estate of a decedent includes the value of
all property in which the decedent had retained more than a five
per cent reversionary interest. The value of the reversionary interest
is determined by the usual methods, including the use of mortality
tables and actuarial principles. INT. REv. CODE oF 1954, § 2037.
Value is a question of fact that must be determined from a consideration of all relevant facts and circumstances in the case. United
States v. Provident Trust Co., 291 U.S. 272 (1933). Mortality tables
are not necessarily controlling factors. Nourse v. Riddell, 143 F.
Supp. 759 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
The Tax Court in some instances has refused to accept the
Commissioner's contention that the value must be determined solely
by mortality tables. In Estate of Denbigh, 7 T.C. 387 (1946), the
court held that the value of the decedent's reversionary interest
is determined by a consideration of the physical condition of the
reversioner rather than by the exclusive use of mortality tables.
This decision was reaffirmed in Estate of Jennings, 10 T.C. 323
(1948).
Although Nourse v. Riddell, supra, is not concerned expressly
with the valuation of a reversionary interest, it does involve the
problem of determining the weight to be given the use of mortality
tables. The Nourse case defines mortality tables as opinion evidence
which might be a sufficient basis upon which to impose a tax if no
other evidence is available. The trend of the decisions seems to
make the method of determining value contingent upon the physical
and mental conditions of the decedent as well as mortality tables.
The principal case is indicative of this trend.

Evidence-The Status of the Mere Evidence Rule
Ds, a physician and his assistant, were convicted of submitting
false and fraudulent claims to the bureau of public assistance. The
state introduced into evidence medical care statements and medical
care records taken from Ds' office. Ds appealed from an order
denying a motion for a new trial on the ground that the records
were mere evidence of the crime and as a consequence the seizure
was unconstitutional. Held, affirmed. The mere evidence rule is
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not a constitutional standard and is not applicable in California.
Peoplev. Thayer, 47 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1965).
The mere evidence rule prevents the admission into evidence of
objects having evidentiary value only, even though the seizure was
properly conducted under a valid search warrant. Such evidentiary
materials are regarded as papers having no value other than the
fact that they are evidence of criminal fraud against the owner.
Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921). Mere evidence includes private papers, books and documents. United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
The rule originated in the Supreme Court and has had frequent
application in federal courts. Most states, however, have remained
silent on the issue. Comment, Limitations on Seizure of Evidentiary
Objects: A Rule in Search of a Reason, 20 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 319, 320
(1953).
The controlling statute in the principal case defined property
properly seized under a search warrant as any item which constitutes any evidence that tends to show that a felony has been
committed or that a person has committed a felony. CAL. PEN.
CoDE § 1524. Although the West Virginia statute is not identical,
it includes some language which may incorporate the principles of
the California statute. In the West Virginia search and seizure
statute, property is defined as including books, papers and documents. W. VA. CODE ch. 62, art. IA, § 2 (Michie, Supp. 1965). While
this provision is not entirely repugnant to the principle of the mere
evidence rule, such an interpretation is entirely possible.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision in Gouled v. United States,
supra, the West Virginia court sustained the admission of a letter
written by an accused and intercepted by a law officer on the
ground that this was not a violation of his constitutional privilege
of self-incrimination. State v. Booker, 68 W.Va. 8, 69 S.E. 295
(1910). As this statute remains uninterpreted and the mere evidence
rule remains unlitigated in West Virginia, the status of the rule is
questionable.
Income Tax-Limitation or Educational Expenses as
Business Expenses
Ps filed a joint income tax return claiming a deduction for educational expenses incurred as a result of carrying on a trade or business. Prior to the year in which the expense occurred, P bad
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resigned her position and was a full-time student. The deduction
was disallowed by the Internal Revenue Service. Held, affirmed.
Before a taxpayer may claim a deduction for educational expenditures incurred for the purpose of maintaining or improving skills,
the taxpayer must be actively engaged in a related activity or have
a definite connection with a position. Canter v. United States, 354
F.2d 352 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
The trade or business deduction of the Internal Revenue Code
allows a taxpayer to deduct all ordinary and necessary expenses of
carrying on a trade or business. INr. Ev. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
Expenditures made by a taxpayer for his education are deductible
when such expenses are a result of maintaining or improving skills
used in the trade or business or of meeting express requirements
of the taxpayer's employer. Treas. Reg. § 1.162 (5). These provisions
are further limited by the requirement that the taxpayer be currently
and actively engaged in the trade or business to which the education relates. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1. Cum. Bun.. 69. Off-duty
seasons and temporary leaves of absence are not considered a cessation of activity for the purpose of this section.
The principal case deals with the judicial interpretation of a
temporary leave of absence. Although this is a case of first impression, prior case law has been indicative of the requirement
that educational expenses must be relative to an existing position.
Namrow v. Commissioner, 368 U.S. 914 (1961); United States v.
Michaelsen, 313 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1963).
The revenue ruling has been interpreted to mean that when a
taxpayer ceases his employment and undertakes educational training in preparation for returning to similar employment or other
business, the deduction is lost. This analysis indicates, however,
that a showing of an intent to resume the original position should
satisfy the rule. Annot., 3 A.L.R. 829, 835 (1965).
The majority opinion in the principal case seems to be contrary
to this interpretation. It would seem that some contractual relationship or enforceable commitment to the original position is mandatory. Mere intent to return to the position, even when accompanied
by subsequent return, will not satisfy the requirement.
Ellen Fairfax Warder
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